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Introduction: Impulsive behaviors are frequently described in brain-damaged patients,
including patients with Alzheimer’s disease (AD). However, few studies have examined
impulsivity changes and associated cognitive impairments in AD and healthy controls.
Consequently, the ﬁrst aim of this study was to compare patients withmild AD andmatched
controls on four dimensions of impulsivity (urgency, lack of premeditation, lack of perse-
verance, and sensation seeking) recently highlighted in the literature. The second objective
was to examine the association between impulsivity changes and cognitive performances on
executive/attentional tasks in mild AD and healthy controls.
Methods: Thirty patients with mild AD and 30 matched controls were administered
a battery of tests that assessed executive and attention processes. In addition, informants
of each patient and control completed a short questionnaire designed to assess the
changes on the four dimensions of impulsivity (Rochat et al., 2008).
Results: Patients with mild AD had higher scores than controls on lack of premeditation and
lack of perseverance dimensions of impulsivity, whereas the two groups did not differ on
urgency and sensation seeking. Furthermore, patients showed signiﬁcant decreased perfor-
mances onmeasures of inhibition of prepotent responses, set-shifting, andworkingmemory,
as well as higher variability of reaction times (RTs) than matched controls. Regression anal-
yses computed on the whole sample emphasized that difﬁculties in inhibition of prepotent
responses signiﬁcantly predicted higher lack of premeditation, and larger variability of RTs
and set-shifting difﬁculties signiﬁcantly predicted higher lack of perseverance, even when
global cognitive functioning, general processing speed, working memory, and age were
controlled for. Urgency and sensation seeking were not associated with any variables.
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Conclusions: These results provide valuable insight into the nature of brain systems and
cognitive processes underlying impulsive behaviors. In addition, they open up interesting
prospects for better comprehension of behavioral and psychological symptoms of AD.
1. Introduction
Impulsive behaviors are common in brain-damaged patients,
including those with neurodegenerative diseases such as Alz-
heimer’s disease (AD; Holmes et al., 1993). Indeed, recent factor
analyses conducted on the Neuropsychiatric Inventory
(Cummings et al., 1994) collected from a large sample of AD
patients have all identiﬁed factors called “behavioural dys-
control” (Hollingworth et al., 2006), “hyperactivity” (Aalten
et al., 2007), or “psychomotor syndrome” (Spalletta et al.,
2010) that globally encompass the same symptoms (e.g.,
agitation, irritability, aggressivity, disinhibition, euphoria,
appetite disturbances, aberrant motor behaviors). These
symptoms are frequently described even in the early phase of
the disease and explain a substantial part of variance of the
total behavioral and psychological symptoms of dementia.
Furthermore, several studies described decision making
impairments in these patients (e.g., Delazer et al., 2007),
which may lead them to become victims of fraud or deceptive
advertisements. We thus assume that a multidimensional
approach to impulsivity as deﬁned in the UPPS Impulsive
Behavior scale (UPPS; Whiteside and Lynam, 2001) might open
up interesting prospects for better comprehension of these
behavioral and psychological symptoms. To our knowledge,
few studies have examined impulsivity changes in AD and
healthy controls, at least from amultidimensional perspective,
and the cognitive impairments associated with impulsivity
changes in AD and healthy controls remain poorly understood.
Some authors have underscored the need to consider
impulsivity as a multifaceted construct (e.g., Evenden, 1999).
From this perspective, Whiteside and Lynam (2001) adminis-
tered several widely used measures of impulsivity and the
Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R; Costa and
McCrae, 1992) to a large sample of undergraduate students.
Whiteside and Lynam’s (2001) central argument is that
although some impulsivity traits result in similar overt behav-
iors (i.e., acting without forethought), their etiologies may be
heterogeneous. A factor analysis conducted on these ques-
tionnaires resulted in a four-factor solution, which was the
basis for the creation of the UPPS. The four dimensions of
impulsivity measured by the UPPS were labeled urgency
(“the tendency to experience strong reactions, frequently under
conditions of negative affect”); (lack of) premeditation
(“the tendency to think and reﬂect on the consequences of an
act before engaging in that act”); (lack of) perseverance
(“the ability to remain focused on a task that may be boring or
difﬁcult”); and sensation seeking (“the tendency to enjoy and
pursue activities that are exciting and openness to trying new
experiences”). Inaddition, eachof the four factorsof impulsivity
strongly correlated with a speciﬁc factor of the NEO-PI-R.
Indeed, urgency was related to the impulsivity facet of neurot-
icism, lack of premeditation and lack of perseverance to low
scores on two facets of conscientiousness (deliberation and
self-discipline, respectively), and sensation seeking to the
excitement-seeking facet of extraversion (Whiteside and
Lynam, 2001).
Many studies using this multidimensional conception of
impulsivity have stressed relationships between the four
dimensions of impulsivity and several psychopathological
states and problematic behaviors. More speciﬁcally, urgency
has been related to borderline personality disorders
(e.g., Whiteside and Lynam, 2003), tobacco craving (Billieux
et al., 2007), compulsive buying (Billieux et al., 2008a),
bulimia nervosa (e.g., Claes et al., 2005), alcohol and drug
abuse (e.g., Anestis et al., 2007; Verdejo-Garcı´a et al., 2007),
problem gambling (e.g., Smith et al., 2007), and obsessi-
veecompulsive symptoms (Zermatten and Van der Linden,
2008). Lack of premeditation has been closely related to anti-
social personality and psychopathic features (Miller et al.,
2003; Whiteside and Lynam, 2003; Whiteside et al., 2005), as
well as to problem gambling (Smith et al., 2007), bulimia
(Smith et al., 2007), substance use, and risky sex (Miller et al.,
2003). Lack of perseverance may represent an important
dimension of predominantly inattentive subtypes of
attention-deﬁcit hyperactivity disorder (Miller et al., 2003;
Whiteside and Lynam, 2001). Finally, sensation seeking has
been associated with delinquent acts, drug and alcohol use,
and risky sexual behaviors (Miller et al., 2003). Sustaining the
validity of the UPPSmodel, several studies have demonstrated
that the various impulsivity facets are differentially involved
in problematic behaviors. For instance, sensation seeking has
been related to the frequency of engaging in risky behaviors
(e.g., gambling frequency and drinking quantity/frequency),
whereas urgency and lack of premeditation have been
speciﬁcally associated with problematic levels of engagement
in those behaviors (e.g., adverse consequences resulting from
gambling such as ﬁnancial problems, chasing behaviors;
Smith et al., 2007).
A further step toward a better understanding of impulsive
behaviors was to examine the psychological mechanisms
underlying each of these dimensions of impulsivity. It has
been suggested that three dimensions of impulsivity (urgency,
lack of premeditation, lack of perseverance) relate to self-
control abilities (such as inhibition processes and decision
making), whereas sensation seeking might be associated with
motivational processes (Bechara and Van der Linden, 2005;
Billieux et al., 2008b; Van der Linden et al., 2006). More specif-
ically, several studies conducted onhealthy young adults from
the community emphasized that urgency was associated with
difﬁculties in inhibition of prepotent response (Gay et al., 2008)
or with a combination of difﬁculties to inhibit prepotent
responses in emotional contexts and decision making under
risky conditions (Billieux et al., 2010). These studies also indi-











in resisting proactive interference in working memory (WM)
(Gay et al., 2008, 2010) and that lack of premeditation was
associated with poor decision making (Zermatten et al., 2005).
Recently, the four-factor structure of a short version of the
UPPS Impulsive Behavior scale, speciﬁcally designed to assess
impulsivity changes occurring in the course of neurodegener-
ative diseases, was supported by exploratory and conﬁrmatory
factor analysis in a sample of 82 patientswith AD (Rochat et al.,
2008).More speciﬁcally, a signiﬁcant increase inurgency, lackof
premeditation, and lack of perseverance was noted, whereas
a decrease in sensation seeking was observed in these patients
(Rochat et al., 2008). Furthermore, this increase of impulsivity
onurgency, lackofpremeditation, and lackof perseverancewas
not associatedwith global cognitive impairment as assessed by
the Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE; Folstein et al., 1975)
or the Mattis Dementia Rating scale (Mattis, 1976), whereas
lower sensation seeking was associated with a lower score on
the MMSE (see Rochat et al., 2008). This multidimensional
aspect of impulsivity has also been recently conﬁrmed with
a similar short form of the UPPS in a sample of 82 patients with
moderate-to-severe traumatic brain injury (Rochat et al., 2010).
On thewhole, by emphasizing theneed to consider fourdistinct
impulsivity-related traits instead of a unique trait, these results
open up interesting prospects for better comprehension and
assessmentof impulsive-relateddisorders frequentlydescribed
in persons with brain damage.
In addition, the changes observed in patientswith ADon the
urgency, lack of perseverance, and lack of premeditation
subscales of the UPPS are congruent with studies showing that
executive and attentional impairments are frequently observed
in AD, even in the early phase of the disease (e.g., Colette and
Van der Linden, 2004). Indeed, numerous studies have demon-
strated that AD patients showed deﬁcits in inhibition and
interference resolution (e.g., Amieva et al., 2004; Collette et al.,
2009), task switching (e.g., Belleville et al., 2008), and central
executive of the WM (e.g., Collette et al., 1999). In this context,
and in line with Gay et al. (2008), we might expect that partici-
pantswith difﬁculties in inhibition of prepotent responseshave
more changes on the urgency dimension of impulsivity. In
addition, the difﬁculties that patients with AD experience in
performing complex tasks might result from shifting impair-
ments. Indeed, set-shifting is requiredwhen individualsneed to
shift attentionor responsepatternsbasedondifferent rules.We
might thus expect set-shifting difﬁculties to be speciﬁcally
associated with lack of perseverance because switching
impairments lead to stereotypedor invariable responses,which
may ultimately preclude the achievement of boring and/or
complex tasks.
Another cognitive process that might be relevant to better
comprehension of impulsivity is sustained attention. More
speciﬁcally, numerous studies suggest that variability of reac-
tion times (RTs) provides a valuable index of periodic lapses of
attention that result from difﬁculties in maintaining or
sustaining attention on task goals due to executive dysfunction
(e.g., Bellgrove et al., 2005; Johnson et al., 2007; Stuss et al., 2003;
Unsworth et al., 2010). In particular, there is evidence for
changes in variability of RTs in very mild (Clinical Dementia
Rating scale of .5) AD (e.g., Duchek et al., 2009). Tse et al. (2010)
also demonstrated that higher neuroticism and lower consci-
entiousness in patients with AD were associated with an
increased variability of RTs. According to these authors, low
conscientiousness might lead to difﬁculties in remaining
focused on a task and thus the goals of the task need to be
reactivated more frequently, whereas neuroticism might be
associated with difﬁculties in inhibiting irrelevant information
(e.g., negative thoughts about one’s ownperformances), in both
cases resulting in an increase of RTs (Tse et al., 2010). Thus,
we expected that the neuroticism-related dimension of
impulsivity, namely, urgency, aswell as the conscientiousness-
related dimensions of impulsivity, namely, lack of premedita-
tion and lack of perseverance, relate to higher variability of RTs.
To the best of our knowledge, no studies have examined
impulsivity changes from a multidimensional perspective and
their associated cognitive impairments in patientswith ADand
in healthy controls. Consequently, the objectives of the current
study are twofold. First, we aimed to compare impulsivity
changes on the short formof theUPPS Impulsive Behavior scale
(informants’ version) between patients with mild AD and
matched control participants. Because mild AD is frequently
characterized bymarked executive/attentional impairments, it
is hypothesized that patients should demonstrate higher
urgency, lack of premeditation, and lack of perseverance than
matched controls. Second, we aimed to examine the cognitive
mechanisms underlying impulsivity changes in both patients
and controls. To this end, we used a Go/NoGo paradigm, the
Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART; Robertson et al.,
1997), in which the participant must withhold a response to
an infrequent target. The SART was chosen because (1) it
provides a valid measure of everyday attentional failures
(Robertson et al., 1997), and (2) it has a sustained attention
component required tomaintain task set during the intertarget
intervals, as well as a response inhibition component required
to suppress inappropriate response tendencies (O’Connell
et al., 2009). Furthermore, the Trail Making Test part B (TMT
B; Reitan and Wolfson, 1985) was used to assess set-shifting
abilities. Several previous studies have demonstrated that
performances on the TMT B are impaired in the very early
stages of AD (e.g., Lonie et al., 2009; Stokholm et al., 2006). Thus,
we more speciﬁcally hypothesized that (1) urgency relates to
difﬁculties in inhibition of prepotent responses in the SART,
thus corroborating previous studies conducted in healthy
young adults from the community (Gay et al., 2008); (2) lack of
perseverance relates to set-shifting difﬁculties in the TMT B;
and (3) the dimensions of impulsivity associated with neurot-
icism and low conscientiousness, that is, lack of premeditation
and lack of perseverance, as well as urgency, should relate to
sustained attention difﬁculties that result in higher variability
of RTs in the SART (see Tse et al., 2010). Finally, to control for
individual differences in global WM and global cognitive func-
tioning, we used the LettereNumber Sequencing Task
(WAIS III; Wechsler, 1997) and the MMSE (Folstein et al., 1975).
2. Methods
2.1. Participants
A total of 60 participants took part in the study. Thirty
nonconsecutive patients were recruited in the Geneva Memory











Hospital of Geneva, Switzerland. All the patients met the
National Institute ofNeurological andCommunicativeDiseases
and Stroke/Alzheimer’s Disease and Related Disorders Associ-
ation criteria for probableAD (McKhannet al., 1984) on the basis
of a detailed medical, neurological, and neuropsychological
examination, and all were at the early stage of the disease
(Clinical Dementia Rating scale, stage 1; see Hughes et al., 1982).
The patients’ ages ranged from 60 to 81 years [M ¼ 72.03,
(standard deviation e SD) ¼ 5.90] and their years of education
from 8 to 16 (M ¼ 13.01, SD¼ 1.95). The control group consisted
of 30 participantswith amean age of 72.05 (SD¼ 7.50) and years
of schooling of 12.60 (SD ¼ 2.77). Control participants were
recruited from the general population and were matched for
age, gender, and years of schooling with the patients. The
control grouphadnoneurological or psychiatric history. In both
groups, overall cognitive functioning was assessed with the
MMSE (Folstein et al., 1975). Only participants for whom a close
relative (e.g., a spouse or adult children) could complete the
informants’ version of a questionnaire assessing impulsivity
changes were included in the study. All participants and rela-
tives spoke French ﬂuently. All subjects gave their written
consent toparticipate, and thestudywasapprovedby theethics
committee of the University Hospital of Geneva.
2.2. Impulsivity measure
To assess the multidimensional construct of impulsivity, we
used a short version of the UPPS Impulsive Behavior scale,
containing 16 items (4 per factor; Rochat et al., 2008). The
informants’ version of this scale, recently validated ona sample
of 82 AD patients by using exploratory and conﬁrmatory factor
analyses (Rochat et al., 2008), assesses impulsivity changes that
might occur on the four components of impulsivity (urgency,
lack of premeditation, lack of perseverance, and sensation
seeking) in the course of a neurodegenerative disease. Each
informant had to assess impulsivity changes on a 5-point Likert
scale (from2 “much less than 10 years ago” toþ2 “muchmore
than 10 years ago”). The total score ranges from 8 to þ 8 on
each subscale. Thus, a positive score indicates an increase of
impulsivity, anegative score indicatesadecreaseof impulsivity,
and a score of 0 indicates no changes compared with 10 years
ago. In the validation study, the reliability score of each of the
four factorswasacceptable toverygood (Cronbach’salpha from
.75 to .95; Rochat et al., 2008).
2.3. Cognitive measures
2.3.1. SART (adapted from Gay et al., 2008; Robertson
et al., 1997)
ThisGo/NoGo task involveswithholdinga keypress in response
to a rare target (the digit “3” among all digits). Participants were
required to respond, as fast and as accurately as possible, with
a response button to all digits except the 3. Digits were pre-
sented for 900 msec and then replaced by a duration mask
(composed of an “X” presented within a ring) for 1000msec.
Digits and mask were white and appeared against a black
background. A practice block of 18 digits (including two targets)
was performed before the participants began the real task in
which 234 digits were presented. During the practice phase,
participants received immediate feedback when making
a mistake. During the real task, each digit appeared 26 times
(whichmakes the targetnumber3a low-probability target of 1/9
or 11%) in a quasi-random order and in one of ﬁve randomly
allocated digit sizes. Three dependent variables were
computed: the number of commission errors (false alarms) as
ameasure of inhibitionofprepotent responses; themeanofRTs
for correct responses as a measure of processing speed; and
a coefﬁcient of variation (CoV; see Duchek et al., 2009) of RTs
computedbydividing theSDby themeanofRTsasameasureof
sustained attention. This coefﬁcient has been chosen instead of
SD because means and SDs are highly correlated (e.g., Faust
et al., 1999). Consequently, measures of intraindividual vari-
ability need to take into account overall differences in mean
performance. In addition, the CoV appears to be a sensitive
marker for early AD (Duchek et al., 2009).
2.3.2. TMT (Reitan and Wolfson, 1985)
TheTMTconsists of twoparts. Part A requires tracing a line that
links numbers in ascending order, while part B requires
participants to connect numbers and letters alternately in their
respective sequence. Completion time for part A and B was
taken into account.
2.3.3. LettereNumber Sequencing Task
(WAIS III; Wechsler, 1997)
In this task, designed to assess verbal WM (both retention and
manipulation of information), participants heard lists of
numbers and letters mixed in random order and presented in
increasing length, from two to eight units. Participants were
ﬁrst asked to repeat the numbers from each list, starting with
the lowest to the highest, and then to repeat the letters in
alphabetical order. The dependant variable was the number of
correctly repeated sequences. An elevated score indicated
better verbal WM performance.
2.4. Data analyses
Data analyses were performed at two levels. First, analyses of
variance (ANOVAs) were performed in order to compare
impulsivity changes on the four dimensions of impulsivity in
patients versus controls.Wealsouseda 95%conﬁdence interval
(CI) todeterminewhether impulsivity changesobservedoneach
facet of impulsivity signiﬁcantly differ from0within each group
of participants. In addition, t-tests for independent samples
were used to compare the two groups on the various executive/
attentional measures. Finally, Pearson’s correlations were used
to evaluate the relationships between variables within each
group. Note that nonparametric analyses (ManneWhitney
U and Spearman Rank-order correlation) were used when
assumptions for using parametric tests were violated and/or
when exploratory analyses identiﬁed outliers. Second, beyond
theusual approach of consideringADas a discrete category that
is qualitatively distinct from normal aging, we also considered
AD as part of the upper end of a continuum that differs only
quantitatively (butnot qualitatively) fromnormal aging. Indeed,
a recent study conducted onmore than 10,000 participantswith
or without dementia recently demonstrated, by using taxo-
metrics and latent mode factor analysis on a wide range of
cognitive tasks (including the TMT B for assessing executive











a continuum) rather than a categorical (representing a distinct
entity) construct (Walters, 2010). Therefore, it appears that
differences between patients with dementia and older adults
without dementia on cognitive tasks are quantitative
(continuum) rather than qualitative (distinct entity; Walters,
2010; see also Collette et al., 2009). Thus, beyond group
comparisons or within groups analyses, we also performed
correlation analyses andmultiple linear regression analyses on
the whole sample to ﬁnd out which cognitive processes best
predict changes on the various dimensions of impulsivity. All
analyses were two-tailed, with an alpha level set at .05.
3. Results
3.1. Sample characteristics
A series of t-tests for independent samples revealed that the
two groups did not differ signiﬁcantly either in age, t(58)¼ 1.02,
p ¼ .31, or in education, t(58) ¼ .81, p ¼ .42, whereas they did
differ on the MMSE, t(58) ¼ 7.00, p < .0001, indicating that the
controls (M ¼ 27.87; SD ¼ 1.61) had better global cognitive
functioning than the patients (M ¼ 23.27; SD ¼ 3.24).
3.2. Internal reliabilities
The Cronbach’s alphas ranged from .71 to .91 (Table 1) and
indicated that all four subscales have acceptable to very good
internal reliability, whether for participants in the clinical
group or for those in the control group.
3.3. Group comparisons
ANOVA performed to examine differences on the four
dimensions of impulsivity showed a signiﬁcant group effect,
F(4,55) ¼ 2.98, p < .05, h2p ¼ .18. Tukey’s honestly signiﬁcant
difference (HSD) post hoc tests indicated that patients had
signiﬁcantly higher changes on lack of premeditation ( p< .01)
and on lack of perseverance ( p < .01) than did controls,
whereas the two groups did not differ on urgency ( p ¼ .35) or
sensation-seeking change scores ( p ¼ .65) (Table 1 for the raw
scores). The 95% CI described in Table 1 indicated (1) a signif-
icant increase on urgency and lack of perseverance for
patients, whereas the increase observed for lack of premedi-
tation did not differ from 0; (2) a signiﬁcant increase on lack of
perseverance and a signiﬁcant decrease of lack of premedi-
tation for controls, whereas the increase observed for urgency
did not signiﬁcantly differ from 0; and (3) a signiﬁcant
decrease of sensation seeking for both groups.
Because the assumption of homogeneity of variance
was violated for some variables (Levene’s test p < .05),
ManneWhitney U tests were used to compare group perfor-
mances on the RTs of the Go/NoGo task, the TMT part A and B
completion time, and the CoV of RTs in the Go/NoGo task. The
t-tests for independent samples were used for the other vari-
ables. Results of the group comparisons (Table 2) indicated that
the groups signiﬁcantly differ on the LettereNumber
Sequencing Task, the TMT part B completion time, and on
both the number of false alarms and the CoV of the RTs of the
Go/NoGo task. These results showed that patients have more
difﬁculties than control participants on these tasks asessing
executive functioning, as well as a higher variability of RTs in
the Go/NoGo task. However, the groups did not signiﬁcantly
differ on global processing speed in theGo/NoGo task and in the
TMT part A.
3.4. Correlation analyses
Table 3 describes the correlations obtained between the
cognitive measures and the four dimensions of impulsivity.
Note that partial correlations were conducted to examine the
relationships between TMT part B completion time and
impulsivity factors while controlling for TMT part A comple-
tion time. For AD patients, lack of perseverance is positively
associatedwith a larger variation of RTs in theGo/NoGo task. A
positive trend was also found between lack of perseverance
and set-shifting difﬁculties in the TMT part B, whereas
a negative trend was found between this dimension of
impulsivity and WM performances. In addition, lack of
premeditation positively and signiﬁcantly correlates with the
numbers of false alarms and with a larger variation of RTs in
the Go/NoGo task. Sensation seeking and urgency did not
signiﬁcantly correlate with any variables. For controls, except
for a positive relationship between the TMT part B and lack of
perseverance, no other correlations reached statistical signif-
icance. For the whole sample, lack of perseverance was nega-
tively associated with MMSE andWM and positively related to
variability of RTs and performances on the TMT part B; lack of
premeditation was positively associated with number of false
alarms in theGo/NoGo task andperformances on theTMTpart
B and negatively associated with WM performances. No other
correlations reached statistical signiﬁcance.1
3.5. Regression analyses
In line with a dimensional approach to dementia (Walters,
2010), the regression analyses were performed on the whole
1 Following a referee’s suggestion, we have further analyzed the
variability of RTs in the Go/NoGo task by ﬁtting subjects’ correct RT
distribution into an ex-Gaussian distribution using the quantile
maximum likelihood estimation procedure in QMPE 2.18 (e.g.,
Cousineau et al., 2004) as Tse et al. (2010) did. In particular, we have
examined whether the tail of the distribution of RTs (as indicated
by the tau parameter in ex-Gaussian ﬁt)might bemore sensitive to
the impulsivity measures than the CoV or false alarm measure.
Analysis of variance shows that therewasno signiﬁcant difference
between the groups for the three ex-Gaussian parameters (m, s, s),
F(3, 56) ¼ 1.21, p ¼ .32, h2p ¼ .06. In addition, the tau parameter did
not signiﬁcantly correlate with any dimensions of impulsivity
(urgency: r¼.04, p¼ .78; lack of premeditation: r¼ .16, p¼ .23; lack
of perseverance: r¼.12, p¼ .35; sensation seeking: r¼ .12, p¼ .35).
Thus, contrary to the results of Tse et al. (2010), our results failed to
show a signiﬁcant difference on the tau parameter between AD
patients and controls. In addition, the tau parameter is less
sensitive to the dimensions of impulsivity thanCoVor false alarms
in the SART task. Although unexpected at ﬁrst sight, this result
might be explained by the nature of the cognitive task used in the
current study versus those used by Tse et al. (2010). Indeed, Go
trials in the SART task are quite similar to a simple RT task, which
is much easier than the Stroop task, the Simon task, and the
switching task used by Tse et al. (2010), because these tasks











sample of participants in order to examine the speciﬁc
contribution of executive/attentional processes in the various
dimensions of impulsivity while controlling for age, WM
performances, general processing speed, and global cognitive
functioning. Consequently, multiple linear regression anal-
yses were performed with each dimension of impulsivity as
the criterion and with the MMSE, WM, number of false alarms
in the Go/NoGo task, TMT part A, TMT part B, and Go/NoGo
CoV as independent variables. In particular, the TMT part A
was included as a predictor in order to control for general
processing speed. However, when performing the regression
analyses with the TMT part A and B, particular attention was
paid to signs of multicollinearity because of the strong corre-
lation between these two variables (r ¼ .60, p < .01). Thus, to
control for the presence of multicollinearity, we used the
variance inﬂation factor (VIF), which shows how much the
variance of the coefﬁcient estimate is being inﬂated by mul-
ticollinearity, and the tolerance score. According to Allison
(1999), VIF values over 2.5 and tolerance below .40 are
considered problematic for multicollinearity. In our case, the
VIF was 2.97 and the tolerance amounted to .33 for the TMT
part B when the dimensions of impulsivity were included as
the criterion. These indices are quite problematic according to
Allison’s criteria, and even mean centering the variables did
not reduce multicollinearity. Consequently, as multi-
collinearity might here be explained by the strong correlation
between the TMT part A and part B, we chose to remove the
TMT part A from the analyses. However, to take into account
general processing speed, we included a measure other than
the TMT part A in the multiple linear regression models, that
is, the mean of RTs on the Go trials in the
Go/NoGo task. Consequently, new multiple linear regression
analyses were performed with the mean of RTs on the Go
trials as a predictor. Note that RTs were transformed by using
natural logarithm to decrease the skewness of their distribu-
tion. Individuals with residuals greater than three SDs were
examined as possible outliers. In addition, multivariate
outliers were examined by using Mahalanobis distance. One
case was identiﬁed as a multivariate outlier (Mahalanobis
distances between 21.73 and 34.86) andwas removed from the
data set. Results revealed that lack of premeditation was
signiﬁcantly predicted only by the number of false alarms in
the Go/NoGo task [b ¼ .44; t(51) ¼ 2.48; p < .05], F(7, 51) ¼ 3.22,
p < .01, adjR2 ¼ .21. In addition, lack of perseverance was
signiﬁcantly predicted by both the TMT part B completion
time [b¼ .45; t(51)¼ 2.66; p< .05] and the Go/NoGo CoV [b¼ .39,
t(51) ¼ 2.57; p < .05], F(7, 51) ¼ 3.94, p < .01, adjR2 ¼ .26. Note
that exploration of the residuals suggested that they were
normally distributed and that no multicollinearity was
emphasized (all VIF < 2.50 and tolerance indices > .40).
Urgency and sensation seeking were not signiﬁcantly associ-
ated with any variables, although a trend was found between
urgency and the variability of RTs in the Go/NoGo task [b¼ .34;
t(51) ¼ 1.90; p ¼ .06].
Finally, another argument conﬁrmed that executive
impairments are speciﬁcally associated with impulsivity, even
when global cognitive processing (including processing speed)
is controlled for. Indeed, to examine whether the link between
lack of perseverance and the TMT part B is mainly due to the
switching component of the TMT part B, and not to other
general cognitive processing also involved in the TMT part A
(processing speed, visuoperceptual abilities), we computed
a new regression with the TMT part B-A completion time
(instead of the TMT part B). Although questionable because of
the low reliability of difference scores, the TMT B-A minimizes
visuoperceptual and WM demands, providing a relatively pure
Table 1 e Means (SDs) and 95% CI of impulsivity change scores for AD and control participants.
Factor Patients Controls
M (SD) 95% CI a M (SD) 95% CI a
Urgency 1.67 (2.41) .77, 2.57a .75 .93 (3.54) .39, 2.26 .91
Lack of premeditation 1.03 (3.70) .34, 2.41 .80 1.23 (2.71) 2.24, .22a .81
Lack of perseverance 2.93 (2.92) 1.84, 4.03a .86 1.00 (2.30) .14, 1.86a .84
Sensation seeking 2.93 (2.76) 3.96, 1.91a .71 2.77 (2.43) 3.67, 1.85a .70
a Note. The absence of 0 in the CI indicates that the observed changes are signiﬁcantly different from 0.
Table 2eMeans, SDs, and results of group comparisons on the executivemeasures for patients and control participants (t-
tests for independent sample or Mann-Whitney U).
Measure Patients Controls t/Z p
M (SD) M (SD)
Go/no-go false alarms 5.13 (3.81) 2.40 (2.11) 3.44 <.01
Go/no-go RTs 486.10 (86.04) 488.26 (49.16) Z ¼ .67 .50
Go/no-go CoV .23 (.05) .20 (.04) Z ¼ 2.23 <.05
TMT part A (completion time) 60.70 (35.98) 43.90 (10.47) Z ¼ 1.74 .08
TMT part B (completion time) 245.63 (135.42) 110.33 (44.49) Z ¼ 4.10 <.0001












indicator of task-switching ability (Sanchez-Cubillo et al., 2009).
The results conﬁrmed that lack of perseverance was still
signiﬁcantly predicted by both the TMT part B-A [b ¼ .38;
t(51) ¼ 2.33; p < .05] and the Go/NoGo Cov [b ¼ .37, t(51) ¼ 2.36;
p < .05], F(7, 51) ¼ 3.61, p < .01, adjR2 ¼ .24. Therefore, we are
conﬁdent that the link between lack of perseverance and the
TMT part B is mainly due to the switching component of the
TMT part B and not to other general cognitive processing.
4. Discussion
This study aimed to compare impulsivity changes on four
dimensions of impulsivity in patients with mild AD and
matched controls and to examine the cognitive processes
underlying impulsivity changes in these participants. The
main results of the study emphasized the following:
(1) informants considered patients more impulsive than
controls for both lack of premeditation and lack of perse-
verance, but the groups did not differ on urgency and
sensation seeking; (2) patients with AD had lower perfor-
mances on all the executive measures, as well as higher
variability of RTs than matched controls; and (3) lack of
perseverance was signiﬁcantly predicted by both set-shifting
difﬁculties and larger variability of RTs, whereas lack of
premeditation was signiﬁcantly predicted by difﬁculties in
inhibition of prepotent responses even when age, WM,
general processing speed, and global cognitive functioning
were controlled for.
First, in accordance with recent studies exploring person-
ality traits associated with AD (Duberstein et al., 2011; Duchek
et al., 2007; Wilson et al., 2007), our results showed that
impulsivity traits related to low conscientiousness, that is, lack
of premeditation and lack of perseverance, are signiﬁcantly
higher in patientswith AD than in controls. These results are in
line with a longitudinal clinicopathological cohort study with
up to 12 years of annual follow-up conducted on 997 older
Catholic nuns, in which a high level of conscientiousness was
associated with a reduced risk for developing AD, even when
age, education, gender, other personality traits, or vascular
conditions were controlled for (Wilson et al., 2007).
In addition, we observed an increase on urgency, lack of
perseverance, and lack of premeditation2 and a decrease on
sensation seeking in patients with AD, which corroborated
previous ﬁndings (see Rochat et al., 2008). However, in contrast
to the ﬁndings of Rochat et al. (2008), in the current study there
was no relationship between the decrease of sensation seeking
andglobal cognitive functioning.One explanationmight be that
the range of severity of global cognitive impairments (MMSE)
differs between the two studies (9e29 in Rochat et al.’s study vs
17e29 in the current study). Tentatively, the decrease of
sensation seeking could be associated with a combination of
severe cognitive impairments on a wide range of cognitive
Table 3 e Correlation analyses for patients with mild AD, healthy controls, and the whole sample.
Variable Group Urgency Lack of premeditation Lack of perseverance Sensation seeking
Age AD .10 .09 .24 .25
Controls .07 .18 .14 .15
Both .10 .01 .09 .08
Years of schooling AD .15 .06 .24 .28
Controls .01 .04 .09 .08
Both .07 .08 .18 .20
MMSE AD .19 .00 .16 .06
Controls .06 .22 .11 .22
Both .17 .19 .34** .04
Go/NoGo false alarms AD .22 .38* .04 .26
Controls .00 .09 .24 .19
Both .15 .39** .23 .22
Go/NoGo RT total AD .25 .00 .29 .09
Controls .06 .22 .19 .03
Both .08 .07 .06 .04
Go/NoGo CoV AD .26 .55** .44* .11
Controls .26 .21 .28 .18
Both .28 .28 .44** .14
TMT part B AD .12 .03 .40 .25
Controls .37 .37 .57** .23
Both .29 .44* .54* .40
LettereNumber Sequence AD .03 .15 .35 .19
Controls .14 .17 .07 .31
Both .14 .31* .34* .06
Note. **p< .01; *p< .05; p< .10. Spearman Rank-order correlation was used for correlations with Go/NoGo CoV, total RTs, and TMT part B. For all
other variables, zero-order correlation (Pearson’s r) was used. Note that partial correlations were used for TMT part B and impulsivity factors,
with the TMT part A score being partialled out. MMSE ¼ Mini Mental State Examination.
2 The mean on lack of premeditation was 1.03 (SD ¼ 3.70) in the
current study,whereas itwas 1.42 (SD¼ 4.20) in the study of Rochat
et al. (2008). In addition, in a sample of 51 patients with AD (and 51
matched controls), it was also found that the increase observed on
urgency, lack of perseverance, and lack of premeditation signiﬁ-
cantly differs from 0 (L. Rochat et al., unpublished data, 2010). It is
thus possible that the small sample size and associated lack of
statistical power explains why the increase on lack of premedita-











functions (memory, executive functions, attention, etc.) that
impedes patients from engaging in risky behaviors. An alter-
native, although related explanation, would be that patients
with lowMMSE scores (or amoderate level of dementia) require
increased supervision from their caregivers in daily living,
which limits the possibility of their taking risks. Finally, our
results partially contrast with those of Duchek et al. (2007) and
Duberstein et al. (2011) who showed that patients withmild AD
had not only lower conscientiousness, but also a higher level of
neuroticism than did healthy controls. We did not, however,
ﬁndanystatistical differencesbetweencontrolsandpatientson
the neuroticism-related facet of impulsivity, namely, urgency.
One explanation may be that urgency corresponds to a nar-
rower construct than does neuroticism. Indeed, as demon-
strated by Whiteside and Lynam (2001), urgency is speciﬁcally
associated with the “impulsivity” facet of neuroticism, but
neuroticism is a broader construct that also includes other
facets related to predisposition toward negative affect
expressed through anxiety, depression, vulnerability, and
hostility (see Costa and McCrae, 1992).
One of the main results of the current study is in regard to
the relationships between lack of perseverance and both set-
shifting difﬁculties and variability of RTs. First, inability to
shift cognitive sets or to shift attention to the most critical
aspectsof the situationmight result in stereotypedor invariable
responses that are not appropriate to the situation. In this
context, and corroboratingourhypothesis, individualswith set-
shifting impairments might have difﬁculties in ﬁnding alter-
native ways to resolve a complex situation, which ultimately
results in difﬁculties in completing boring and/or difﬁcult tasks.
Second, higher variability of RTs constituted another signiﬁcant
predictor of lack of perseverance. Higherwithin-task variability
probably results from a breakdown of an executive/attentional
control system that can no longer sustain attention ormaintain
thegoals of a taskacross timeand inhibit irrelevant information
(Ducheket al., 2009;Westet al., 2002). In thisway, our results are
in line with a recent study conducted on a sample of healthy
young adults from the community that indicated that lack of
perseverance was associated with difﬁculties in resisting
proactive interference in WM (Gay et al., 2008), that is, in
resisting the intrusion into memory of information that was
previously relevant but has since become irrelevant (see
Friedman and Miyake, 2004), such as intrusive thoughts or
memories. From this perspective, the higher variability of RTs
might be explained by difﬁculties in inhibiting intrusive
thoughts and memories that provoke lapses or drifts of atten-
tionaway fromthe task,which in turnmake theachievementof
a boring and/or complex task particularly difﬁcult. Our results
are partially in line with those of Tse et al. (2010), who showed
that both low conscientiousness and high neuroticism in very
mild AD (Clinical Dementia Rating scale of .5) were related to
higher variability of RTs. Indeed, in the current study, neither
the dimension of impulsivity related to neuroticism (i.e.,
urgency)nor oneof the twodimensionsof impulsivity related to
conscientiousness (i.e., lack of premeditation) were predicted
by variability of RTs. Our results thus suggest that a particular
dimension of impulsivity (lack of perseverance) associatedwith
a speciﬁc facet of conscientiousness (self-discipline) is speciﬁ-
cally related to sustained attention difﬁculties as assessed by
a measure of the variability of RTs.
Contrary to our expectations, urgency was not associated
with the number of false alarms in the Go/NoGo task, whereas
lack of premeditation was. The absence of signiﬁcant rela-
tionships between inhibition of prepotent responses and
urgency is worth comment. Two studies have shown mixed
results regarding the relationship between commission errors
in a Go/NoGo task and urgency. Indeed, Gay et al. (2008) found
such an association in a sample of healthy young adults,
whereas Perales et al. (2009) did not. A direct comparison of
these studies and the current one is difﬁcult because of
methodological differences, such as the type of participants
(young vs older adults with or without AD), sample size, and
impulsivity assessment (impulsivity changes vs global trait).
However, in our view, the main argument underlying the
absence of relationships between urgency and inhibition
relates to the absence of emotional material in the Go/NoGo
task used in the current study. Indeed, on the one hand,
urgency has been conceptualized as a tendency to act impul-
sively in an emotional context (Cyders and Smith, 2008), and,
on the other hand, several studies have shown that emotional
contexts might interfere with the ability to inhibit prepotent
responses (Schulz et al., 2007; Verbruggen and De Houwer,
2007). In addition, from a neuroanatomical point of view,
emotional dyscontrol episodes resulting from high urgency
might be the consequence of a dysfunctional interaction
between the prefrontal or cingulate brain systems involved in
cognitive control and the subcortical brain systems involved in
emotion generation, such as the amygdala (e.g., Ochsner and
Gross, 2005). In particular, a recent study showed that symp-
toms of irritability and agitation in patients with AD were
associated with amygdala hyperresponsiveness to the human
face when expressing neutral or negative emotions thatmight
result fromdirect effects of ADpathology in the amygdala and/
or indirect effects in regions that modulate amygdala activity
such as the prefrontal cortex (Wright et al., 2007). These results
tentatively suggest that cognitive control processes such as
inhibition of prepotent responses are no longer effective in
inhibiting amygdala activation in response to emotionally
laden stimuli in patients with AD (e.g., Scheibe and
Carstensen, 2010). In this context, further studies should
more speciﬁcally examine the relationships between urgency
and inhibition of prepotent responses in emotional contexts in
patients with AD and healthy controls.
The positive relationship found between lack of premedita-
tion and impairments in inhibition of prepotent response is of
main interest aswell. Inour view, thedualprocessesof thinking
and reasoning theory (see Evans, 2003) constitute a relevant
theoretical framework to understand the relationship found
betweendifﬁcultiesofprepotent response inhibition and lackof
premeditation. Indeed, this theory proposes a distinction
between an automatic and an analytical or deliberative system.
More speciﬁcally, choices resulting from the automatic system
dependonrapidandparallel processesproducedviaassociative
learning, and they remain unconscious until the decision is
made. This automatic system does not recruit controlled or
executive processes. By contrast, the analytical system is
slower, sequential, requires controlled cognitive processes such
as executive functions and WM, and allows abstract and
hypothetical thinking. Thus, our results suggest that impair-











activation of this demanding analytical, deliberative process-
ing, which is necessary to consider the immediate beneﬁts in
relation to the future costs of anactionwhenmakingadecision.
Instead, the automatic system remains active, resulting in
unplanned actions that might have detrimental consequences
for individuals. These data are in linewith studies showing that
difﬁculties in inhibiting prepotent responses have been asso-
ciatedwith poorer decisionmaking in a laboratory task (Billieux
et al., 2010; Noe¨l et al., 2007). These resultsmight also help us to
understandwhyolder adults have less ability tomakedecisions
in laboratory tasks (e.g., Delazer et al., 2007; Zamarian et al.,
2008) and why they might thus be more susceptible to
misleading or deceptive advertisements or fraud. However,
further studies should speciﬁcally examine the relationships
between inhibition of prepotent responses, decision making,
and the premeditation dimension of impulsivity in older adults
with or without neurodegenerative conditions.
Some limitations to the study should be discussed. First, our
sample of patients is small, and therefore the results can be
generalized only with caution. In the same vein, the absence of
signiﬁcant changeson lackofpremeditationwithin thegroupof
patients in the current study might be explained by the small
sample size of patients. In addition, it might be argued that the
signiﬁcant decrease of lack of premeditation over time in
healthy controls, and not in AD, contradicts the rationale of
pooling both populations for correlation analyses. This obser-
vation might even be considered as an indication of “domain-
related” successful aging rather than an indication of a general
continuumbetween aging andAD.However, the distribution of
premeditation scores across the whole sample does not indi-
cate a bimodal distribution (which would conﬁrm lack of
premeditation as domain related successful aging rather than
an indication of a general continuum), but instead a normal
distribution. These data are congruent with the hypothesis of
a continuum between aging and dementia (see Walters, 2010).
Even if the UPPS impulsivitymodel sheds relevant new light on
the multidimensional aspects of impulsivity, further charac-
terization of each of the four dimensions is required, and the
overlap between some dimensions (e.g., urgency and lack of
premeditation) needs to be clariﬁed. Second, the few signiﬁcant
relationships between executive/attentional measures and
impulsivity in control participants suggest that the tasks used
in the current study may lack sensitivity to highlight interin-
dividual differences in healthy participants. However, these
results might also indicate that other processes contribute to
the increase or decrease observed on some dimensions of
impulsivity inparticipants, suchascompensatorymechanisms
(e.g., Freund, 2006; Park and Reuter-Lorenz, 2009; Phillips and
Andre´s, 2010) or improvement of emotional experience in aging
(e.g., Carstensen et al., 2011).
To conclude, althoughAD is characterized by a progressive
cognitive decline, behavioral symptoms frequently occur
even in the early phases of the disease. The current results
suggest that a multifaceted approach to impulsivity could be
of interest in understanding these symptoms. Further studies
should, however, speciﬁcally examine how the various
dimensions of impulsivity, and associated cognitive mecha-
nisms, relate to broader behavioral disorders in AD patients.
In addition, by more speciﬁcally identifying the cognitive
processes associated with changes observed on various
dimensions of impulsivity, the current study provides valu-
able insights into the nature of brain systems and cognitive
processes underlying impulsiveness.
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